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ABSTRACT 
 
Analysis of the difference between the lowest and second lowest bids, or bid-spread, in a ‘lowest 
wins’ auction is of possible value in strategic bidding; providing an indication of mistakes in 
bids; determining a justifiable amount of bid security; and a means of providing some insight 
into the consequences of non-traditional auction arrangements.  Bid-spread analysis, as 
developed in this paper, provides some explanations concerning the nature of bids and their 
statistical properties.  In particular, it is shown here that, through the analysis of several datasets 
originating in various parts of the world, the percentage bid-spread is consistent with the 
assumption that bids are entirely random, being drawn from a lognormal distribution.  The high 
values of the correlation coefficients, together with the failure of the two most popular correlates 
- contract size value and number of bidders – to account for any significant trends once the order 
statistic effects are removed provides overwhelming evidence in favor of the dominance of 
inherent variability in bidding. 
 
Keywords: Bidding, tendering, bid-spread, spread, money left on the table, Vickrey Auctions, 
statistical models. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Bid-spread, also variously termed money “left on the table” (Gates, 1960: 13), “The Spread” 
(Park and Chapin, 1992: 187) or just plain “spread” (Gates, 1960: 13), is concerned with the 
difference between the lowest and second lowest bids.  For bidders, the primary interest in bid-
spread is that it is “… the amount by which the lowest tenderer is underbidding the second 
lowest tenderer and which therefore is foregone profit” (Runeson, 1987: 103).  This has led to its 
development as a possible aid in strategic lump sum or unit price bidding (Gates, 1960) although 
the former has been criticized as resulting in fewer jobs won, with uncertain consequences (Park 
and Chapin, 1992: 188).  Bid-spread has also the potential for use in identifying mistakes in bids 
and determining the maximum justifiable amount of bid security (Gates, 1960). 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the “remarkable” sensitivity of strategic bid-spread-based 
bidding to the status quo of contract auctions won and lost has led Runeson (1987) to the 
conclusion that bidders are very much market oriented in their pricing, making the ‘foregone 
profit’ unrecoverable in the face of the economic pressures involved.  This leads to the 
conclusion that traditional lowest wins sealed bid auctions must produce subnormal profits in the 
long run due to the difference between the lowest and second lowest bids – a conclusion also 
reached by Nobel Laureate William Vickrey in his general analysis of highest wins1 auctions 
(Vickrey, 1961).  Despite these, what are to date, uncontested results there have been no 
apparent changes in the still predominant competitive bidding mode of construction 
procurement.  Vickrey’s suggested correction to overcome the problem – that of awarding the 
contract to the lowest bidder at the second lowest price (now popularly termed the Vickrey 
                                                 
1 The symmetry of highest and lowest wins auctions makes the distinction analytically trivial 
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Auction) – has never even been trialed.  Why this is the case is not clear, though probably due to 
the counterintuitive nature of the objections to the lowest bid criterion. 
 
In this paper, we reexamine the empirical nature of bid-spread, its modeling, explanation and 
prediction through the analysis of seven datasets, Runeson’s interpretation and the Vickrey 
solution. 
 
 
DATA 
 
Seven separate datasets were analyzed.  Each dataset, except dataset 7 for which only the lowest 
and second lowest bid values were available, comprised the values of all the bids for each 
contract auction, updated to the first quarter 1980 sterling equivalent by the relevant price 
indexes and exchange rate series’.  Details of the datasets and summary statistics of the updated 
bids are given in Table 1. 
 
 
Data
set 
Source Type Period No of 
auctions 
Average 
low bid 
Average 
Std Devn 
Average 
Coeff of Varn 
1 Skitmore (1986) London building contracts 1981-2     51 1.57m   82k   5.52 
2 Skitmore (1986) London building contracts 1976-7   373 0.81m   47k   6.36 
3 Brown (1986) USA Govt agency building 
contracts 
1976-84     62 1.39m 119k 19.06 
4 Runeson (1987) Australian PWD contracts 1972-82   152 1.51m 103k   6.98 
5 Runeson (1987) Australian PWD specialist 
contracts 
1972-82   161 0.21m   29k 16.21 
6 Skitmore (1981) UK building contracts 1969-78   272 0.81m   48k   6.03 
7 Drew (1995) Hong Kong Govt building 
contracts 
1981-90   199 0.96m - - 
All    1270 0.90m 59k 8.54 
Table 1: Datasets 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1) 
 
Gates’ (1960) analysis of bid results published by the USA State of Connecticut for 1957 to 
1959 and the states of New Hampshire and Vermont from 1958 to 1959 found, “by the method 
of least squares [and log-log paper], the best fitting curve” (p18), to be 
 
p = 108C–0.266           (1) 
 
where p and C denote the percentage bid-spread and lowest bid value respectively.  In terms of 
dollars this is 
 
B = 1.08C0.734           (2) 
 
where B denotes the average (dollar) bid-spread. 
 
In contrast, Runeson (1987) compared the mean bid/cost estimate ratios for the lowest and 
second lowest bid against the number of bids in the auction for his own dataset of 265 contract 
auctions, showing that not only do the average ratios for the lowest and second lowest bids 
reduce as the numbers of bidders in the auction increase, but that the average difference between 
the ratios also reduces with increasing numbers of bidders.  A simpler version of this finding 
was reported by Park and Chapin (1992) in their analysis of “60 recent jobs” in which they 
found the average bid-spread to be 8.0, 5.8, 3.8 and 2.0 percent on jobs having 4 to 6, 7 to 9, 10 
to 12 and 13 to 15 bidders respectively, suggesting a linear model to be appropriate. 
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It is clear, therefore, from a purely empirical perspective (none of the previous research having 
proposed a priori reasons) that two likely explanatory variables exist – the contract size value 
(as measured by Gates’ C) and the number of bids in the contract auctions, to which we will 
refer for convenience sake as n2.  Interestingly, none of the previous studies considered both 
variables, with Gates concentrating on C to the exclusion of n, and Runeson and Park and 
Chapin concentrating on n to the exclusion of C. 
 
Gates has also shown that transformations of both the dependent variable (bid-spread) and the 
independent variables are likely to be beneficial, having used the raw (dollar) bid-spread, 
percentage spread, log transformed spread, raw C and log C. 
 
To subject the data to as rigorous analysis as possible and yet avoid logistical and computational 
overload we concentrated on three forms of dependent variable (raw, log and percent bid-
spread) and four forms of each of the two independent variables (raw, square root, reciprocal 
and log – in order of increasing strength of transformation). 
 
In addition, in view of the lack of any theoretical basis for the choice of independent variables, 
one extra variable was added based on the properties of the order statistics uniform probability 
density function (rectangular distribution).  Letting s be the standard deviation of the uniform 
pdf, then the range, r = s√12.  The difference between the expected value of the lowest and the 
expected value of the second lowest of a sample size n drawn from this distribution is γ = 
r(n+1)-1, which is equivalent to γ = s√12(n+1)-1.  Of course, the γ here is based on expected 
values and is therefore only a mean value, i.e., even if the data were drawn from a uniform 
distribution, γ would be the average result over a long set of trials and the results of each trial 
                                                 
2 Thus for an n-size auction, there are n number of bids entered. 
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would bound to differ from this central tendency.  However, γ was included nevertheless as an 
indicator of the likely amount of randomness of the bid-spread. 
 
The full set of Pearson correlation coefficients for all the datasets and indication of their 
significance (pr<0.05) are given in Tables 2a-c.  For Table 2a, which is concerned with the raw 
bid-spread, the value of the lowest bid, contract size value provides the most consistently high 
correlation, with the raw C and all three transformations being significant in all but one case (C–1 
for dataset 4).  Of these, C, √C, lnC and C–1 recorded the highest coefficients 4, 2, 1 and 0 times 
respectively, the order also reflected in the ranked correlation coefficients for the pooled (All) 
data.  The number of bidders is not significantly correlated in any except dataset 7, where the 
raw n and its three transformations are all significant, although in most cases less so that contract 
size value.  The expected value variable, γ, is however, highly correlated, and records the highest 
coefficient of all the independent variables for four out of the six datasets on which it was used, 
with the extraordinary value of 0.9694 for dataset 6.  It is also interesting to note that the highest 
three γ correlations were for the three UK datasets.  Again, the results of the pooled data analysis 
gives a good reflection of the order of importance of the independent variables, with the top 
ranked γ followed by C, √C and lnC respectively in order of strength of correlation. 
 
 
Dataset n √n n–1 lnn C √C C–1 lnC γ 
1 -0.0453 -0.0614 0.1030 -0.0769 0.6175 0.5917 -0.3627 0.5247 0.8168 
2 0.0434 0.0521 -0.0736 0.0605 0.4147 0.4544 -0.1770 0.3956 0.7333 
3 -0.1080 -0.1124 0.1339 -0.1188 0.7386 0.7817 -0.3345 0.7127 0.6994 
4 0.0384 0.0453 -0.0380 0.0475 0.7588 0.6767 -0.1727 0.5238 0.6942 
5 -0.1152 -0.1127 0.0970 -0.1085 0.2811 0.4040 -0.2453 0.4327 0.6039 
6 -0.0480 -0.0431 0.0176 -0.0361 0.9007 0.7277 -0.1339 0.4496 0.9706 
7 -0.2517 -0.2909 0.4382 -0.3361 0.6032 0.5679 -0.2679 0.4846 na 
All -0.0036 -0.0011 -0.0030 0.0009 0.7263 0.6164 -0.0868 0.4300 0.8416 
Italics = significant at 5% level 
Table 2a: Correlations: raw bid-spread 
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Table 2b gives the results for the ln bid-spread dependent variable.  These are quite similar to 
the results for raw bid-spread, with all the contract size values significant and higher than the 
number of bidders variables.  The log transformed γ is again the best correlate for four of the six 
datasets analyzed and again provides the highest correlation for the pooled data.  Again dataset 3 
is different, but with √C and lnC the best this time.  LnC also provides the best correlation for 
dataset 4. 
 
 
Dataset n √n n–1 lnn C √C C–1 lnC lnγ 
1 0.0684 0.0576 -0.0164 0.0449 0.4753 0.5344 -0.5363 0.5622 0.5731 
2 0.1004 0.1030 -0.1009 0.1040 0.3521 0.4561 -0.2756 0.4688 0.6537 
3 -0.2307 -0.2454 0.2641 -0.2566 0.5988 0.7080 -0.4770 0.7555 0.6965 
4 0.0375 0.0527 -0.0577 0.0618 0.5307 0.6198 -0.3928 0.6347 0.6321 
5 -0.2171 -0.2187 0.2057 -0.2173 0.2742 0.4212 -0.4291 0.5338 0.6611 
6 0.0293 0.0274 -0.0263 0.0262 0.4702 0.5789 -0.3490 0.5890 0.6666 
7 -0.2034 -0.2274 0.2824 -0.2501 0.4841 0.5172 -0.3413 0.4975 na 
All 0.0133 0.0166 -0.0154 0.0181 0.4433 0.5556 -0.2712 0.5752 0.6737 
Italics = significant at 5% level 
Table 2b: Correlations: ln bid-spread 
 
 
Table 2c gives the results for the percentage bid-spread (percentage second lowest bid is above 
the lowest bid) dependent variable.  Here, the results are more variable, with dataset 1 having no 
significant correlations and datasets 3 and 4 having only one significant correlation (that of γ%).  
Across all the individual datasets, γ% provides the highest correlation for all the 6 datasets for 
which it was computable, as well as recording the highest correlation for the pooled data. 
 
The big surprise here is that the contract size value variable, or any of its transformations, is 
significantly correlated at all.  In fact, in all cases, the average percentage bid-spread decreases 
with increasing contract size value, suggesting that percentage bid-spread is not exactly 
proportional to contract size value, as is implied by (1).  One possible cause of this might be that 
the C results are being confounded with the n.  In other words, larger contract size values attract 
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larger number of bidders.  This possibility can be tested in several ways.  The simplest is to use a 
trivariate regression analysis that includes the suspected confounding variables. 
 
Dataset n √n n–1 lnn C √C C–1 lnC γ% 
1 -0.1235 -0.1213 0.0001 -0.1181 -0.0448 -0.0789 0.0959 -0.1064 0.2621 
2 -0.3106 -0.3126 0.3462 -0.3382 -0.1416 -0.2214 0.3602 -0.3078 0.8175 
3 -0.0953 -0.1191 0.1751 -0.1413 -0.2033 -0.2268 0.2438 -0.2474 0.3106 
4 -0.1460 -0.1448 0.1245 -0.1406 -0.0087 -0.0409 0.0631 -0.0758 0.3616 
5 -0.1192 -0.1381 0.1630 -0.1529 -0.2212 -0.2872 0.2076 -0.2968 0.3518 
6 -0.1861 -0.1927 0.1964 -0.1968 -0.0501 -0.1331 0.2561 -0.2178 0.5750 
7 -0.3066 -0.3352 0.3649 -0.3566 -0.1539 -0.2148 0.2961 -0.2756 na 
All -0.1574 -0.1860 0.2382 -0.2115 -0.1311 -0.2370 0.2495 -0.3449 0.4107 
Italics = significant at 5% level 
Table 2c: Correlations: % bid-spread 
 
This was done for all the cases where a form of C was significant in Table 2c and with n–1, the 
generally highest correlated form of n, and γ%.  The results of all the regressions are 
summarized in Table 3, indicating the coefficient of regression, multiple r (which is directly 
comparable with the correlation coefficients in Table 2) and the t-significance or otherwise of 
each of the two independent variables.  These show that, for dataset 2, the highest achievable r 
of around 0.82 has no significant contract size value effect.  For dataset 5 highest r values of 
around 0.39 to 0.41 include several forms of contract size value, while dataset 6, with a best r 
values of around 0.56 have no significant contract size value form. 
 
Dataset 7, with no standard deviation measure available includes forms of both contract size 
value and number of bidders, with the all best models for the total pooled datasets, with an r 
value of around 0.43 to 0.48 including contract size value forms. 
 
It is not easy to compare between the three sets of results in Tables 2a-c as each uses a different 
dependent variable.  Which model is best depends on the purpose of the model and, ultimately,  
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Dataset Indep var 1 Sig Indep var 2 Sig r 
2 C No n–1 Yes 0.3539 
 C No γ% Yes 0.8211 
 √C Yes n–1 Yes 0.3620 
 √C No γ% Yes 0.8213 
 C–1 Yes n–1 Yes 0.4073 
 C–1 No γ% Yes 0.8216 
 LnC Yes n–1 Yes 0.3798 
 LnC No γ% Yes 0.8215 
5 C Yes n–1 No 0.2623 
 C Yes γ% Yes 0.3915 
 √C Yes n–1 No 0.3220 
 √C Yes γ% Yes 0.4110 
 C–1 Yes n–1 Yes 0.2804 
 C–1 No γ% Yes 0.3512 
 lnC Yes n–1 Yes 0.3440 
 lnC Yes γ% Yes 0.3976 
6 √C No n–1 Yes 0.2224 
 √C No γ% Yes 0.5648 
 C–1 Yes n–1 No 0.2788 
 C–1 No γ% Yes 0.5639 
 lnC Yes n–1 Yes 0.2590 
 lnC No γ% Yes 0.5656 
7 C Yes n–1 Yes 0.4186 
 √C Yes n–1 Yes 0.4430 
 C–1 Yes n–1 Yes 0.4591 
 lnC Yes n–1 Yes 0.4650 
All C Yes n–1 Yes 0.2516 
 C Yes γ% Yes 0.4345 
 √C Yes n–1 Yes 0.3031 
 √C Yes γ% Yes 0.4549 
 C–1 Yes n–1 Yes 0.3513 
 C–1 Yes γ% Yes 0.4298 
 lnC Yes n–1 Yes 0.3913 
 lnC Yes γ% Yes 0.4868 
 
Table 3: Trivariate analyses of percentage bid-spread assuming uniform distributions 
 
the loss function involved.  What does seem to emerge from this analysis, however, is the 
importance of the random indicator, γ, as it figures prominently in every case.  The statistic, γ, it 
will be recalled, was devised as a simple measure of randomness based on the assumption of a 
uniform distribution of bids and, as an expected value, was not expected to account for all the 
variance in the data.  In the next part of the analysis, we examine this variable in more detail 
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against some obvious alternatives to offer some causal explanation of the statistical nature of 
bid-spread. 
 
THE STATISTICAL HYPOTHESIS 
 
The large literature on bidding theory and models (see Stark and Rothkopf, 1979, for an early 
bibliography) is replete with what can be termed ‘the statistical hypothesis’ in that auction bids 
are assumed to contain statistical properties such as fixed parameters and randomness.  The first 
contributions (e.g., Friedman, 1956) assumed that each bidder drew bids from a probability 
distribution unique to that bidder, with low frequency bidders being pooled as a special case.  
Later work by McCaffer and Pettitt (1976) and (Mitchell, 1977) for example, assumed the 
probability distributions to be non-unique and homogeneous, enabling a suitable distribution 
shape to be empirically fitted (uniform, in the case of McCaffer and Pettitt) and the derivation of 
order statistics based on an assumed (normal) density function.  Later empirical work by 
Skitmore (1991) showed the homogeneity assumption to be untenable for his three datasets of 
construction contract auctions, at least insofar as its superiority in predicting the probability of 
lowest bidders is concerned (Skitmore, 1999).  Runeson and Skitmore (1999), however, have 
cast doubt on the whole future of the heterogeneous approach to modeling construction contract 
auction bids on the basis of its necessary, but forced, assumption of temporal invariance (fixed 
parameters) in the absence of the lengthy repeated trials assumed by the statistical model – each 
bidder not bidding frequently enough to generate a reasonable size dataset. 
 
The assumption of homogeneity, of course, solves the problem in a stroke as, if each bidder is 
assumed to bid from the same distribution, all bids made by all bidders contribute to the 
empirical estimation of the parameters, the increased amount of data made available this way 
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thus enabling the temporal invariance assumption to be relaxed at least to a yearly time span.  
Therefore, if we were to be able to determine the type of distribution, and its parameters, 
perhaps on a yearly basis, it would then be possible to predict the order statistics involved and 
hence the value of the bid-spread.  That the correlation results for the statistic γ have been so 
successful so far in this analysis suggests this may be feasible.  However, there are a few 
difficulties in the way before this can be exploited.  One of these is to specify the type of 
probability distribution involved.  Another is to predict its parameters. 
 
Several types of probability distributions have been considered to be appropriate for construction 
contract auction bids.  Of these, only two have been fully tested empirically.  In the first of these, 
as has already been mentioned, McCaffer and Pettitt (1976) found the uniform distribution 
function to be the best fit for a set of Belgian construction contract auction data.  In the second, 
Skitmore (1986)’s replication of this with three sets of UK data indicated a three parameter3 
lognormal to be the most appropriate, with a non-constant second moment (variance) that is 
possibly a function of the first moment (average bid) for each contract auction.  Being positively 
skewed, the lognormal assumption satisfies the corresponding qualitative findings of at least two 
other empirical studies of construction contract auction bids (Park, 1966; Beeston, 1974) and 
intuitions of the majority of theoreticians in the sealed bid field generally (e.g., Arps, 1965; 
Brown, 1966; Crawford, 1970; Capen et al, 1971; Klein, 1976; Weverbergh, 1982).  Parameter 
estimation of lognormal distributions is, of course, a simple matter as all that is needed is to take 
the log values of the bids and work with the normal distribution thereafter. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Later modified by Skitmore and Pemberton (1994) to the simpler two-parameter lognormal distribution for 
application in strategic bidding. 
 12
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (2) 
 
The analysis described above was repeated with γ being replaced by the difference (denoted by 
the symbol λ) between the expected value of the lowest and expected value of the second lowest 
order statistics for the lognormal distribution for each auction.  Table 4 gives the Pearson 
correlation coefficients.  All are significant at the 5% level 
 
Dataset Raw spread Ln spread % spread 
1 0.7933 0.5827 0.2886 
2 0.7312 0.6559 0.8358 
3 0.8385 0.7630 0.4573 
4 0.7621 0.6647 0.4339 
5 0.55540 0.6696 0.4827 
6 0.9708 0.6693 0.6179 
7 - - - 
All 0.8640 0.6836 0.6018 
 
Table 4: λ correlations 
 
As expected, the correlation coefficients are generally higher for the λ values than were the γ 
values in Table 2a-c, and particularly so for the percentage bid-spread. 
 
Trivariate analyses were run on each dataset for the percentage bid-spread against all the various 
forms of the independent variables to investigate the effect of partialling out the effects of the λ 
values.  In all cases, except the small sample dataset 1 with C–1 and log C, the λ variable was 
significantly correlated with the percentage bid-spread.  In only two instance, that of √C and C–1 
for dataset 5 (r=0.5041 and 0.5031 respectively), was a significant result obtained for a non-λ 
variable.  For the pooled (All) dataset, however, all the independent variables except raw C were 
significant, with r-values ranging from 0.6062 to 0.6124. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The difference between the lowest and second lowest bids in a ‘lowest wins’ auction is of 
interest as it represents the lowest bidder’s “foregone profit”, and thus of possible value in 
strategic bidding; providing an indication of mistakes in bids; determining a justifiable amount 
of bid security; and a means of providing some insight into the consequences of non-traditional 
auction arrangements.  Bid-spread analysis, as developed in this paper, provides some 
explanations concerning the nature of bids and their statistical properties.  In particular, it is 
shown here that, through the analysis of several datasets originating in various parts of the 
world, the percentage bid-spread is consistent with the assumption that bids are entirely random, 
being drawn from a lognormal distribution.  The high values of the correlation coefficients, 
together with the failure of the two most popular correlates - contract size value and number of 
bidders – to account for any significant trends once the order statistic effects are removed 
provides overwhelming evidence in favor of the dominance of inherent variability in bidding. 
 
It should be noted though that, although the effects are qualitatively consistent for all the datasets 
analyzed, this is not the situation when the datasets are pooled.  Why this should be the case is 
not clear and in need of further study if some universal model is to be found.  Meanwhile, the 
methods used in this paper should be of value in analyzing individual datasets. 
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